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The secret garden? Elite metropolitan
geographies in the contemporary UK
Niall Cunningham and Mike Savage
Abstract
There is an enduring, indeed increasing awareness of the role of spatial location in
defining and reinforcing inequality in this country and beyond. In the UK, much
of the debate around these issues has focussed on the established trope of a long-
standing ‘north-south divide’, a divide which appears to have deepened in recent
decades with the inexorable de-industrialisation of northern Britain presented in
stark counterpoint to the burgeoning concentration of wealth in London and the
south-east, driven by the financial and ancillary services sectors. Due to a lack of
available data, such debates have tended to focus solely on economic inequalities
between places, and until now there was little understanding of how these disparities
played out in the social and cultural domains. This paper significantly advances our
understanding of the true meaning of spatial inequality in the UK by broadening
that definition to encompass not only the economic, but also the social and cultural
arenas, using data available from the BBC’s Great British Class Survey experiment.
We argue that these data shine a light not only on the economic inequalities between
different parts of the country which existing debates have already uncovered but to
understand how these are both reinforced andmediated across the social and cultural
dimensions. Fundamentally, we concur with a great many others in seeing London
and the south-east as a vortex for economic accumulation but it is also much more
than that; it is a space where the coming together of intense economic, social and
cultural resources enables the crystallisation of particular and nuanced forms of elite
social class formations, formations in which place is not incidental but integral to
their very existence.
Keywords: social class, Great British Class Survey, elites, spatial analysis, Geo-
graphical Information Systems (GIS), spatial inequality
Introduction
Inequality has always been a central concern of sociology and while sociolo-
gists have stressed the importance of an awareness of the spatial context within
which social life occurs, academics from within the discipline have historically
tended to analyse the issue from a largely aspatial perspective. Furthermore,
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while there is consensus on growing inequality in the United Kingdom in gen-
eral terms (Dorling andRees, 2003;Wilkinson andPickett, 2009;Dorling, 2011)
as well as an understanding of the powerful spatial patterns of persistence in
the distribution and reproduction of disadvantage over the long term (Dorling
et al., 2000; Gregory, 2009), the corresponding geography of affluence as a field
of intellectual study has been left relatively fallow until very recently (Bur-
rows, 2013a, 2013b). To some extent this has been reflective of the traditional
concerns of sociology and a lack of sufficiently-detailed data (Lobao et al.,
2007), but it was also a product of an innate cautiousness within the discipline
over the adoption of technologies such as Geographical Information Systems
(GIS) which were previously perceived as ‘socially-constructive’ (Harvey and
Chrisman, 1998). However, Savage and Burrows (2007) have more recently ar-
gued in favour of the need to embrace new methodological approaches within
sociology in order to extend the discipline’s reach and relevance.
The Great British Class Survey (GBCS) provides a powerful resource for
the spatial analysis of the elite in British society, as due to its unprecedented
scope it enables us not merely to identify a group hitherto absent from existing
influential social schema due to the limitations of previous samples (Penn,
1981; Savage and Williams, 2008), but to anatomize in remarkable detail the
‘micro-classes’ (Butler and Savage, 1995; Devine, 2010; Grusky and Weeden,
2001, 2008) that exist within this social formation. Within the elite there exists
a number of smaller groupings, striking for the ways in which their spatial
locations can be seen to be emblematic of a wider sense of ‘habitus’ in which
the connection between objective social structures and individual responses or
choices is mediated (Bourdieu, 1984). In this way we can provide empirical
substantiation to the definition of an ‘elite’ as an inherently recursive concept
(Dorling, 2013).
Elites and space: an intellectual framing
It has become a sine qua non for current political debates on social change to
acknowledge that inequalities between the richest and poorest are increasing,
and that such inequalities haveprofound social consequences (egDorling, 2011;
Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; Wacquant, 2008; Atkinson et al., 2013; Hills et al.,
2013).While such texts reflect a vital and necessary focus, it is also apparent that
within the social sciences there has been until very recently, a relative neglect of
thosewhooccupy the upper echelons of the socio-economic hierarchy, and very
specifically on their geographies (Burrows, 2013a). In addressing these issues
it is clear that a ‘social exclusion’ framework which focuses solely on those
at the bottom of the socio-economic spectrum and defines the issues in terms
of the factors which cause disadvantage and which operate to exclude them
from the social body, is deficient. This can act to construct a narrative solely
around the characteristics and problems of the most disadvantaged people and
places, and does not address how the power and privileges of the advantaged
are organized.
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To date, little academic attention has sought to counter-balance this by
developing our understanding of the issues around the geographies of privilege
and affluence. This lacuna has been the product not just of political framing but
is also linked to a lack of available data with comprehensive and sophisticated
questions on the socio-cultural practices and preferences of this group (though
see Hay and Muller, 2012). As things stand we have a very limited empirical
understanding of the geographies of privilege across the country as a whole and
despite the influential interventions of radical geographers such asDorlingwho
has mapped a considerable range of indicators of privilege and power, these
have not, to date, allowed a mapping of the kinds of measures of cultural
and social capital that have been elaborated in recent sociological research
and offered a powerful intervention in the field of ‘cultural class analysis’ (eg
Bennett et al., 2009). This paper contributes to a rebalancing of these debates
in presenting the most detailed sociological mapping of elite practices in the
UK currently available.
A starting point is that we need to more fully understand the remaking of
elite advantaged groups in relation to the seismic economic restructuring of this
country which occurred in the last decades of the twentieth century and which
juxtaposes deindustrialization of northern Britain to the burgeoning wealth of
London and the south-east, where the financial services sector has become an
ever-increasing component of the regional and by extension, national economy
(see, in general terms, Bowman et al., 2012; Dorling, 2011; Ertu¨rt et al., 2011).
The geographical aspects of this shift are familiar, being organized around a
‘north-south’ narrative, with much intellectual energy focused on measuring
deprivation as a means of charting the problematic features of these processes.
The intensity ofmedia coverage around these issues (BBC, 2014)would suggest
that such dynamics are a recent phenomena, but the roots of such reductive
binaries can be traced back much further (Campbell, 2004). If we take the
long view, the UK has always been dominated by a London commercial and
mercantile elite, whose economic interests were forever outward towards the
empire rather than north towards the industrial heartland (Rubinstein, 1993).
In this paper we seek to elaborate this argument about London’s role as an
elite vortex.
However, we insist at the outset that our argument in no way suggests that
London is a land of milk and honey for all its residents and the inequalities
evident across the country are at least as pronounced at intra-city level within
London. For Sassen (1991), increasing social polarization in London is the
direct outcome of ‘hourglass’ (Nolan, 2001) macroeconomic dynamics which
have seen the burgeoning of highly paid work in the financial services sector
matched by a ballooning of the workforce at the opposite end of the employ-
ment spectrum in the service sector, while opportunities for employment and
advancement in the middle ranges for skilled workers have evaporated due to
the collapse of theUK’smanufacturing base in the second-half of the twentieth
century. This has led to a growing army of people in poorly rewarded and inse-
cure work, a new social division of labour which as Butler andWatt (2007) have
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found, has profound spatial implications as this group is both essential to, yet
increasingly marginalized by the ongoing capitalist project in London (Massey,
2005). For Hamnett (2003), a more appropriate metaphor is perhaps the cock-
tail glass rather than the hourglass, for he sees the problem not as one of a glut
of low-quality work options, but of any meaningful options for a rump of long-
term economically inactive people who effectively lie beyond the impact of
such labour market impulses. Massey (2007) makes an important intervention
by bringing the inter-regional and intra-regional debates together by exposing
the north–south dichotomy as what she sees as almost a form of spatial false
consciousness which serves to obscure poverty and inequality within the very
ha-has of the nation’s neoliberal elite in London and the south-east through an
obsessive focus on divisive north–south competition. In our view, revealing the
distinctive elite character of a minority of London’s population allows these
arguments to be elaborated further.
It might be suggested that another factor acting to shroud inequality in
London and the south-east is the particular transnational character of wealth
in the city: this is a central feature of the global city around which differing
authors agree. Sassen (1991) has seen this as the outcome of processes of
economic dispersal which, ironically, have led to the development of major
financial centres to service the requirements of a globalized economy in which
the relationship between big corporations and national governments is one
of inexorable, increasing subservience (Butler and Watt, 2007). This line of
argument points to the emergence of a placeless, global elite, facilitated by a
new capitalist order in which information is now the most powerful currency,
the exchange of which has been facilitated by rapid technological innovation
(particularly the Internet), andnecessitatedby exactly the sort of decentralizing
forces of production identified by Sassen (1991). Manual Castells memorably
articulates this vision in The Rise of the Network Society (1996), but in the case
he presents one hears powerful echoes of that made by Melvin Webber (1964)
more than three decades earlier in a paper in which he argued that ‘intellectual
elites’ constituted
spatially dispersed, nonplace communities. These folk approximate the true cos-
mopolities for whom territorial distance is a minor barrier to interaction and whose
professional social communities are the least shaped by territorialism. For these,
social propinquity is least dependent upon spatial propinquity.
However, our argument is actually that London should not simply be seen as
the centre of a placeless elite, and that in fact we can detect distinctive forms
of elite territoriality at work here (and see further Burrows and his colleagues,
2013b, on London’s ‘Super-Rich’).
The source for our work is the Great British Class Survey (GBCS). We
acknowledge at the outset that the methodological issues in deploying this are
intense. Savage et al. (2013) show that GBCS data is biased towards a younger
sample who are more likely to have attended university than is representative
of the population for the UK at large. For our purposes here, however, this
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offers a striking opportunity as it provides a powerful lens to explore in spatial
and statistical terms a group which has been neglected in sociological studies
in recent decades, notably the small GBCS ‘Elite’ which our earlier work has
shown was differentiated from the six other classes in terms of their strik-
ing possession of economic capital (and to a lesser extent, their considerable
holdings of cultural and social capital).
The fact that we have access to such detailed information on this grouping
confounds sociological and public conceptions of the elite as a sector of British
society who tend to reveal little about themselves, their habits and their re-
sources. Rather, the dataset is testament to Massey’s (2007: 120) assessment
that the literal and metaphorical location of this group in British society is in
fact ‘a space of introspection and absorption’. The unprecedented level of en-
thusiasm which this cadre has itself shown for the GBCS suggests that we may
have to fundamentally reappraise the social and cultural motifs of modesty and
reserve which have traditionally been applied to upper classes sociology (see
in general, on the ‘modesty’ of the successful, Miles et al., 2011).
This paper proceeds by initially seeking to explicate the sample skew in
the GBCS survey through linkage to representative, contemporary datasets in
the 2011 census. Our methodological concern here is to consider how far the
sample skew within the GBCS affects its potential to offer a representative
mapping of the elite. Is it likely that because the GBCS elicited interest from
the well educated and affluent, that the GBCS Elite is unrepresentative of the
elite in the wider British population? Here our analysis overlaps with that of
the other papers presented in this collection, several of which also examine
the micro facets of the GBCS sample skew. In so doing, we will powerfully
underscore the utility of GBCS’ identification of an ‘elite’ as a representative
or ‘real’ social group.
The second section will move to explain how the Elite class was constructed
and can be understood in terms of the constituent cultural, economic and social
capital variables available through the GBCS. This will be useful in allowing
us to unpack the specific geographical dimensions of these three key variables
that we used in constructing our latent class analysis, and this throws up some
important findings, especially with respect to the specificity of London.
Finally, the paper will dissect the group further to address the spatial, so-
cial, cultural and economic complexity which belies the descriptor ‘Elite’. As
one commentator has remarked, the term is inherently ‘recursive’ (Dorling,
2013), with varying Elites in different places, characterized by varying patterns
of access, residence, mobility and consumption. The GBCS has remarkable
potential to address these concerns, and the final section will shed new light on
these patterns in the context of Greater London as a vortex for Elite construc-
tion and containment in the UK. The sheer sample size means that this paper
can provide a national ecological approach to issues of inequality which Samp-
son (2012) has argued provides a vital means of understanding social disparities
and a methodological counter-balance to the ‘individualistic fallacies’ of tradi-
tional sociological scholarship. While this discussion has clearly acknowledged
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the global character of wealth in London and whilst also recognizing that dy-
namism and mobility are powerful forces in uber-elite formation (Elliott, 2013;
Urry, 2013), our focus here for practical reasons is on the capital as a locale
for our more expansive conceptualization – the GBCS Elite. In this analysis
the focus is on London as a site of elite agglomeration and consumption rather
than on its place as a node within a much more nebulous and unquantifiable
network of international elite transactions and interactions.
The end of a ‘modest’ elite? Making sense of the sample skew
The initial GBCS research paper published in April 2013 clearly stated the
heavy selection bias in the survey towards university educated and more af-
fluent social groups (Savage et al., 2013), with the National Statistics Socio-
economic Classification (NS-SEC) I/II groups of senior managers, modern and
traditional professionals all being severely over-represented in the BBC web
sample. As we recognized, this poses a challenge to using the GBCS for de-
veloping a model of the class structure which we addressed by using a small
nationally representative survey (GfK) alongside the GBCS. As critics have
pointed out, this means we are not fully able to deploy the rich and granular
detail provided in the web survey, and it is this issue which we will initially
address in this analysis.
Let us begin by noting that the Elite class which we distinguished in Savage
et al. (2013) is derived using latent class analysis on measures of economic,
social and cultural capital. The elite is characterized by its extremely high
levels of economic capital, alongside high (though not outstanding) scores for
‘highbrow’ cultural capital as well as social capital. Taking David Rose’s (2013)
point that it is also possible to derive a more conventional measure of an elite
using NS-SEC occupational measures, a starting point in our reflections is to
consider the overlap between these two geographies.1
Figure 1 provides a starting point for our analyses by demonstrating the
striking overlaps between the spatial distribution of the GBCS’ Elite and the
NS-SEC I population drawn from the 2011 census. NS-SEC I, comprising 12
per cent of the British population is composed of higher managers and profes-
sionals. We also include a more restrictive definition of the elite, NS-SEC I.i
(Large employers and higher managerial occupations) with about 3 per cent
of the workforce. The census data provide an extremely useful comparator not
simply because they are based on the complete population and therefore com-
pletely representative, but also because the 2011 enumeration was conducted
in extremely close temporal proximity to the first wave of data from the GBCS
survey, gathered between late January and the end of June 2011. The 2011
census was conducted approximately halfway through this collation period on
the night of 27 March.
Responses to the GBCS were skewed not only in socio-economic terms
but also in terms of geography. Figure 1(a) shows the spatial distribution
of respondents to the GBCS by unitary authority in Great Britain and
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Figure 1 a) GBCS participation relative to the 2011 census population aged 18
and over; b) the census population aged under 35; c) NS-SEC I and; d)
NS-SEC I.i populations
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Northern Irish county.2 Along with swathes of western Scotland and the north
of England, much of Northern Ireland features in the lowest quintile of re-
sponse areas to the survey (indicated in white/blue) and the response rate
was 50 per cent lower than might be expected given the population base. At
the other end of the scale, areas over-compensating in terms of response to
the survey (indicated in black/red), were clearly heavily clustered in Greater
London and the south-east of England more generally, and especially in the
areas west of London in the heart of the home counties. We can also see how
university towns and cities are likely to figure as being over-represented, with
York, Abedeen, Exeter, Canterbury, Aberystwyth and Norwich all standing
out from their hinterlands.
In general terms, this provides a remarkably close reflection of the distri-
bution of the UK’s NS-SEC I population (Figure 1(c)), which as a statutory
definition of the ‘elite’ is a profoundly southern formation. Nevertheless, at
intra-regional level pronounced disparities are also apparent. In the north of
England, this is evident in the ‘islands’ of affluence in Cheshire and in that
part of North Yorkshire approximating to the so-called ‘Golden Triangle’ with
vertices linking York, Harrogate and plush north-east Leeds (House of Com-
mons, 2006: Ev.317). Here, the distribution of NS-SEC I is strong, though
GBCS responses are somewhat less evident. While within Greater London,
historic inequalities between the east and west of the capital clearly still persist
in contemporary metrics (Dorling et al., 2000; Gregory, 2009). A subdivision of
NS-SEC I is alsomapped (Figure 1(d)), identifying ‘large employers and higher
managerial and adminstrative occupations’, in essence, an evenmore exclusive
statutory determination of an elite. The south-east bias is again clearly evident
although within Greater London the use of NS-SEC I.i appears to discriminate
considerably more across the capital.
Broadly, the GBCS itself is considerably over-represented by those living
in elite areas, as one would expect given the general skew towards the elite
classes. This is further testimony to the performative character of the survey
itself, which is a research instrument which interests and engages those who
are relatively economically and socially privileged (see further, Savage, 2015).
However, we can see interesting exceptions in this broad skew which makes
it clear that the GBCS responses are not a simple reflection of elite geogra-
phies. There is the notable pattern in settlements outside the south-east in
areas with large student and academic populations, groups who responded in
disproportionately high numbers to the survey. The concentration of higher-
level educational establishments and employment opportunities in urban areas
more generally lies behind the broader demographic imbalances that exist be-
tween predominatly urban and rural districts, as evidenced in Figure 1(b),
which shows that the proportion of the census population aged under 35 is also
heavily skewed to the UK’s towns and cities.
Let us now turn to consider the geography of the GBCS elite itself.
Figure 2(a) shows the distribution of the Elite relative to the GBCS sample
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Figure 2 The spatial distribution of the GBCS Elite, a) relative to the GBCS as
a whole; b) when used as a proxy for NS-SEC I against the working-age census
population; and c) NS-SEC I for reference purposes
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as a whole, while Figure 2(b) benchmarks Elite respondents from the GBCS
against the population as a whole using it as a proxy for NS-SEC I, as derived
from the 2011 Census. For ease of comparison, Figure 2(c) once again shows
the distribution of the census NS-SEC I population from the 2011 census. It
is perfectly clear from comparison of Figures 2(b and c) that the GBCS Elite
presents a geography that is almost uncanny in so closely reflecting that evident
solely from the indicators of employment and occupation used to construct the
NS-SEC schema. The geography of our Elite class from the GBCS is an almost
perfect match with that derived fromNS-SEC census data, which in some ways
is surprising given that measures of economic capital include house price and
savings which are only indirectly linked to occupation. Furthermore, the eco-
nomic capital measures used in the latent class model fromwhich our Elite was
derived were given only equal weighting against the social and cultural input
variables. In any event, the overlaps are further borne out in the sequence of
graphs in Figure 3, which show the relationship between spatial units more
precisely. Figure 3(a) plots the standardized scores for participation rate in the
GBCS against the NS-SEC I composition of each area by spatial unit and show
a very close fit. Some of the outliers are highlighted on the graph and are highly
revealing. The City of London is globally recognized as a centre of financial
transaction and accumulation, a fact reflected in the socio-economic profile of
the vast majority of its select group of residents. However, notwithstanding this
fact the City still responded to the survey in terms wildly over-proportionate
to its wealth. Other areas which exceeded even the quadratic relationship be-
tween participation and NS-SEC I composition were, for example, Oxford and
Cambridge, highlighting the pronounced bias towards elite university towns in
the response pattern (see more generally, Wakeling and Savage, this volume).
At the other end of the spectrum, the example ofArmagh is an area where both
participation rates andNS-SEC I composition weremuch lower. It is likely that
in Northern Ireland, where response rates more generally were much lower
than would be predicted by the population base, issues of national identity pro-
vided an important interaction effect in determining responses to the ‘Great
British Class Survey’, with participation rates lower in areas with substantial
Catholic populations. It is likely that, in effect, the particular character of the
Northern Irish polity, historically structured more around ethnic rather than
class distinctions, had a profound role to play in explaining this regional ef-
fect (Cunningham, 2013; Gregory et al., 2013; McGarry and O’Leary, 1995a;
1995b). In overall terms, a strong relationship existed between the variables,
with an r2 of 0.65 between participation and NS-SEC I composition.
Figure 3(b) shows that in terms of the intersection between NS-SEC I and
the GBCS Elite, the relationship in distributions was even stronger, again in-
dicating that rather than being an abstract concept, the GBCS Elite closely
resembles in spatial terms, formulations of privilege that represent the current
academic and statutory benchmark. It is little wonder, then, that standardized
values for levels of NS-SEC I, participation and Elite correlate powerfully with
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Figure 3 Z score scatterplots of spatial units for a) NS-SEC I population and
survey participation rates and; b) NS-SEC I and GBCS Elite populations
r2 = 0.83 for NS-SEC I and Elite geographies and an r2 = 0.77 for participation
and NS-SEC I.3 It would seem therefore undeniable that the socio-economic
complexion of areas has had a profound bearing on participation levels in the
survey, and statistical testing reveals that this relationship was quadratic rather
than linear, with the degree of participation increasing with the NS-SEC I pro-
portion of the spatial unit. Using NS-SEC I population as the predictor and
participation as the dependent variable in a quadratic curve estimation regres-
sion showed that NS-SEC I had a significant effect in predicting participation
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Figure 4 Mapping of residuals from a quadratic curve estimation model with
GBCS survey as the dependent variable and NS-SEC I composition as the
predictor
rateswithβ = 0.76, t(361)= 22.59,p< 0.01. It also explained a significant degree
of variance in the participation rates, r2 = 0.65, F = (1, 361)328, p = < 0.01.4
Figure 4maps the resulting residuals from the above regression. Thepurpose
of this is to highlight if patterns exist in terms of areas which over-contributed
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or under-contributed to the GBCS in relation to what we would expect from
their NS-SEC I populations. This provides some interesting insights in placing
the survey skew into a wider national socio-economic perspective, as fairly
large areas of the south-east were moderately under-represented given their
socio-economic profiles as predicted in the regression model. In London, the
results show that patterns of over-participation in the GBCS were actually
rather more concentrated in the boroughs immediately to the south and north
of the river Thames in central London, rather than encompassing the western
boroughs such asWestminster andKensington andChelseawhich include some
of the most affluent areas in the entire country. There appear to be distinctive
‘London’ effects here which probably reflect the fickle and nuanced imprint
of gentrification upon the capital and suggest that it is those with ‘emerging’
cultural capital whomight be predisposed towards theGBCS (see Savage et al.,
2013; Prieur and Savage, 2013; Savage and Hanquinet, 2015). Thus, one of the
London boroughs which saw the highest levels of participation is Hackney, an
area of extreme and well-established gentrification which has been the focus
of much attention for urban geographers (Butler, 1992, 1995, 1997; Butler and
Robson, 2003; May, 1996). This is a theme we will return to later on in the
paper.
Beyond London, the map also underlines once again the pronounced uni-
versity town effect earlier noted: Aberystwyth, Brighton, York, Oxford, Cam-
bridge, Manchester, Bristol, Newcastle, Edinburgh, Southampton all come
through strongly in this analysis as having GBCS responses higher than one
would expect on the basis of their NS-SEC I distributions. It is worth noting
that the areas of London with over-representations are also sites of the city’s
major universities.
Constructing the Elite
The strong spatial and statistical overlaps between the UK’s census social
class geographies and the GBCS Elite can be taken as evidence towards the
sociological value of the GBCS latent class analysis. This section sheds greater
light on the geographies of the constituent economic, social and cultural capitals
whichwere used to construct this concept of theElite, sowe can begin to dissect
their geography in greater detail so that we can see if the Elite in different areas
of the UK have different social and cultural characteristics. At this point in the
analysis, we depart from census data which has no direct information on these
issues, and can begin to use the unusual insights from the GBCS with their
extensive questions on cultural and social issues.
First, let us show the map of economic capital. Figure 5 presents the geo-
graphical distributions of the three constituent measures of economic capital:
mean household income, mean property value and mean household savings.
Household income and property value (Figure 5(a and b)) display similar dis-
tributions and are both heavily skewed to London and the south-east, reflecting
both the greater opportunities for higher-paid employment in the region aswell
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Figure 5 The spatial distributions of the three constituent measures of
economic capital in the GBCS; a) mean household income; b) mean property
value; and c) mean household savings
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Figure 6 The spatial distributions of the two constituent social capital measures
in the GBCS; a) mean averaged status of social contacts; and b) mean size of
social networks
as the heavy and related underlying bias in the UK property market. Wemight
see the close association between these two maps as a telling indication of the
overlap between inequalities in both labour and housing markets. A slightly
more dispersed pattern can be observed with regard to household savings
(Figure 5(c)) though the same general bias towards the south-east is again
clearly evident. The patterns of economic resource concentration present an
orthodox picture of the UK, but the image becomes more interesting as we
turn to the other capitals.
The two constituent measures of social capital presented in Figure 6 effec-
tively represent mirror images of one another. Figure 6(a) shows the spatial
distribution of themean status of a respondent’s social contacts averaged across
their spatial unit. Areas in black/red therefore indicate those parts of the coun-
try where the mean averaged status of the respondents’ social networks were
highest and white/light grey/blue where they were lowest. These status scores
were calculated using a ‘position generator’ technique in which respondents
were asked to state whether or not they knew socially any people from a list
of 37 occupational backgrounds (34 of which were used in the analysis). Here,
eachoccupational backgroundwas given a scorebasedon theCambridgeSocial
Interaction and Stratification (CAMSIS) scale. This indicates that there was a
greater concentration of people with higher-status social networks in London
and the south-east than elsewhere in the country. Furthermore, this pattern ap-
peared to be remarkably clustered once again, closely reflecting the trends for
the economic indicators. This distribution was effectively a diametric inversion
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of the pattern in Figure 6(b). This map displays the mean number of people
from different occupational backgrounds that people knew socially, thus pro-
viding a measure of the socio-economic size of people’s social networks. In
contrast to Figure 6(a), Figure 6(b) shows that the number of contacts seemed
to increase with distance from the capital. So while in the south-east there was
a concentration of higher-status social networks, these networks tended to be
far less extensive than was the case as one moved further from the capital.
To some extent, this is what one would expect, as if one knows more occupa-
tions, their status scores are likely to be deflated as one is largely constrained
to know respondents of different occupations with contrasting status scores.
Nonetheless, the two measures are not tautologous. It would be possible for
those with relatively small social networks to only know those doing routine
occupations. Furthermore, given that we have demonstrated how closely rates
of participation track representative census indicators, we can be confident
that we are mapping substantive socio-spatial distinctions.
Finally, Figure 7 presents the two measures of cultural capital, ‘emerging’
(Figure 7(a)), and ‘highbrow’ (Figure 7(b)). Emerging cultural capital activities
include a wide range of everyday pursuits such as playing and watching sport,
surfing the Internet, visiting social networking sites and socializing with friends.
Highbrow activities were more conventional and traditional forms of cultural
engagement, including visits to theatres, museums and stately homes, listen-
ing to jazz or classical music or eating at French restaurants. Both of these
contrasting indicators emerged as discrete forms of cultural capital as they
were differentiated on the second axis of a Multiple Correspondence Analysis
(MCA) of the wide range of cultural activity indicators available in the GBCS
dataset. One criticism of these indicators lay in the fact that both could be seen
to be influenced by underlying demographic factors. In the case of emerging
cultural capital, many of the activities identified through the MCA procedure
could be seen as tending to be more associated with younger age groups, while
the highbrow input variables might well be seen as leaning towards older and
more affluent social groups as effectively ‘posh’ pursuits. In essence, there is
an inherent danger that the identification of such seemingly discrete modes
of engagement is merely modelling underlying demographic and class socio-
economic biases towards particular types of cultural engagement. Read care-
fully, the MCA analysis refutes such criticisms as neither forms of highbrow or
emerging cultural capital are the simple product of age, since it is only those
who have attended universities and are in managerial and professional groups
who are predisposed towards them, and there is also considerable other re-
search pointing to the existence of these different forms of cultural capital (see
Prieur and Savage, 2013 for a review and discussion). Furthermore, the associ-
ation between age and the different modes of cultural capital is integral to their
sociological conceptualization. Having made these points, we can now seek to
explore the geography of this intersection between the demographics and these
forms of cultural capital so that we can better understand their constitution.
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Figure 7 The spatial distributions of the two constituent cultural capital
measures in the GBCS: (a and b) emerging; and (c and d) highbrow. The (a
and c) maps have been weighted against underlying demographic and
socio-economic populations using representative census indicators
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Figure 1(b) has already shown that urban areas tend to have higher popula-
tions of young people than predominantly rural districts and it likely therefore
that any mapping of emerging cultural capital will bias towards towns and
cities. To counter that problem, the emerging (Figure 7(a)) and highbrow
(Figure 7(c)) indicators mapped here have been weighted against the under-
lying age structures and class distributions available from the representative
census sample.5 When both class and age have been controlled for, emerging
cultural capital shows a distinctive concentration in the ex-industrial heartlands
of northern England, Northern Ireland and parts of Scotland, with lower scores
in much of the south-east with the exception of parts of East London and the
Thames Gateway. West London and the Home Counties no longer appear to
be a centre for such cultural forms, and instead it is the cultural vibrancy of the
northern English cities (in the red belt stretching from Merseyside into York-
shire), and some of the Scottish,Welsh and Irish districts which appear striking.
By contrast, highbrow cultural capital is much more dispersed when the
data are weighted, but a bias towards the inner boroughs of London can still be
discerned. Across the country as a whole, a weighted approach suggests amuch
less conventional relationship with the geographies of economic affluence than
might otherwise have been predicted and points to a distinctive urban and
geographical quality to forms of cultural capital that cannot be reduced simply
to the demographic or class characteristics of these places.
London as ‘elite metropolitan vortex’
By this stage it should have become apparent that spatial complexity is integral
not simply to an understanding of the relationship between different groups
and classes, but also within them. Using spatial analysis techniques we can
shed further light on the matryoshkan quality of the Elite and the power of
geography in the group’s formationbecause traditional statistical approaches to
class analysis have tended to rely on global measures, assuming that underlying
relationships tend not to vary across space (Gregory and Ell, 2007: 163). In the
remaining part of the paper, we are especially interested in unravelling the
relationship between the metropolis of London and aspects of Elite formation.
We are interested here in pursuing the idea that the contemporary elite is
necessarily a metropolitan class, that is, that its geography is not an incidental
by-product of where it happens to reside, but, by contrast, that the London
metropolitan area is itself a vortex in which a distinctive elite formation is
generated. The spatial proximity of relatively large numbers ofElite individuals
is implicated in the development of distinctive cultural and social, as well as
economic patterns which appear distinctive to the metropolitan Elite. To put
this in terms of complexity theory, we might be able to detect forms of elite
‘emergence’ in the city which cannot be found elsewhere. Insofar as this is the
case, it is powerful repudiation of the claims of writers such as Castells (1996),
Bauman (2007) that elites are somehow a ‘place-less’, global formation. As
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the early findings from Burrows’ (2013a, 2013b) work also attests, there is
clear evidence of a strong sense of territoriality within our Elite and spatial
propinquity may therefore not be as irrelevant to this group as Webber’s
(1964) earlier work also suggested. Webber saw such parochial concerns as
the preserve of the working class, who had such an investment of economic,
social, cultural and familial resources within their immediate communities.6
This corresponds neatly to Savage’s (2010) assertion that contra Castells and
Webber, space is crucial not only to an understanding of middle-class identity
in the form of ‘elective belonging’, but must be integral to any broader analysis
of the factors which act to construct social class more generally (Savage, 1996).
From a Bourdeusian (2000) perspective, these processes of gentrification are
a clear manifestation of the construction of habitus, an urge for socio-spatial
security and stability. In terms of the disorientating impacts of globalization,
the enduring, indeed increasing power of locality is testament to a very human
desire for a kind of socio-spatial anchorage to mitigate against its centripetal
cultural effects (Savage et al., 2005).
Figure 8(b–e) presents the results of a univariate Local Indicator of Spatial
Association (LISA) analysis of the various input variables used in the construc-
tion of the latent class model in the original GBCS analysis. The technique
works by identifying statistically significant clusters using a local regression
methodology (Anselin, 1995; O’Sullivan and Unwin, 2003). LISA has an ad-
vantage over other spatial clustering techniques such asMoran’s I in being able
to identify not only where high and low concentrations exist, but also where
outliers of either extreme values are surrounded by opposing scores. The anal-
ysis thus returns four possible outcomes: areas of high values surrounded by
other high values (‘High-High’ clusters), areas of low values surrounded by
other low values (‘Low-Low’ clusters), outliers of high value surrounded by
low values (‘High-Low’) and the inverse pattern (‘Low-High’).
Figures 8(b and c) show the results of LISA analysis on the cultural variables
based solely on the Elite. Within the Elite, London and parts of the south-east
stand out as important in the formation of emerging cultural capital, while rural
andmore distant parts ofWales and the south-west indicate clustering of lower
values within the class. In contrast, highbrow cultural capital (Figure 8(c)) does
not appear to discriminate to anything like the same extent within the Elite
as no discernible clusters emerge. This evidence suggests there are distinctive
patterns of cultural engagement within the London Elite which are not found
elsewhere, testifying to the city as cultural vortex for this group.
Social capital (Figures 8(d and e), on the other hand, does once again appear
to show amuch more pronounced pattern and one that reflects the wider trend
within the GBCS (Figure 6) towards more enclosed social networks of higher
status in the south-east versus wider and a lower mean status of social contacts
as one moves further from London.
In Figure 8(a) an adaptation on the technique has been applied showing
the results of a bivariate LISA analysis which acts to cluster the data along
two axes (in this case, mean household income and mean property value).
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Figure 8 Local Indicator of Spatial Association (LISA) clustering of the
GBCS Elite by: a) economic capital; b) emerging cultural capital; c) highbrow
cultural capital; d) number of different contacts in social network, and e) mean
status of social network
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Figure 9 Residential geographies of the London Business Elite
Perhaps more than any other map, it is this which highlights the profound
stratification that exists within the Elite. Economic power within this group is
exclusively clustered in the south-east of England (black/red), where property
values in addition to higher average income levels act to mark out a sub-group
of elevated financial advantage. In contrast, grey areas identify what we might
loosely define as the ‘poor Elite’ in Wales and parts of northern England. The
outliers are also interesting in throwing a fascinating light on the relative and
spatially contingent nature of the Elite with clusters around Lancashire and
South Yorkshire, where incomes are high but property assets relatively modest
(backslash hatch/light blue). While in and around the south-east we can also
see the inverse pattern in the slashed hatch areas as property values fall away
on the cusp of the metropolitan economic vortex.
A further way of exploring the structure of the elite within London, building
upon this recognition of its cultural, economic and social specificity is to break
it down into three distinctive types, namely the business, cultural and legal
groups. There are 1,431 members of the cultural Elite, determined as those
in the Elite latent class who also have the following and related occupations:
actors, artists, arts officers, dancers, higher education teaching professionals,
journalists, editors, photographers, authors, conservation professionals and
musicians. This compares with no less than 3,000 chief executives (members of
our Elite latent class, living in London). Finally, we can distinguish a distinctive
legalElite constitutedbybarristers, judges, legal professionals and senior police
officers (n = 404).
Figures 9 and 10 examine the geography of these different kinds of
Elite within London, showing a partly overlapping, but partly differentiated
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Figure 10 Residential geographies of the a) London Cultural and b) London
Legal Elites.
geography between them. The business Elite (Figure 9) – the largest and most
affluent sector of the LondonElite – aremost likely to be located in thewestern
heartlands of London, centred on Westminster, Kensington and Chelsea, and
stretching north through Camden and Islington, and with outliers in Green-
wich andRichmond. The legal Elite (Figure 10(b)) by contrast, is centredmore
on the Eastern centre of London (closer to the law courts) notably in the City
of London itself, and reaching south of the river into Southwark. The cultural
Elite (Figure 10(c)) is themost spatially dispersed, and least likely to be located
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Figure 11 Changing patterns of recruitment into the London Business,
Cultural and Legal Elites by parental class (a, b and c), and by secondary
educational establishment type (d, e and f)
in the western heartlands of the LondonElite. There is a substantial north Lon-
don contingent centred inHaringey, Islington andCamden; a southern London
grouping located in the Borough of Wandsworth (Battersea, Balham and Put-
ney), and more suburban clusters in Ealing and Hammersmith (close to the
BBC studios at White City where some of their number might be employed).
We can thus detect a distinctive Elite micro-geography within London, partly
explicable in terms of the economic assets of the different groups (with the
business Elite being the most affluent), partly by the geography of employ-
ment, but also possibly through the spatio-cultural preferences of these groups
themselves. Affluent incomers have traditionally been drawn to the inner-city
by an urban aesthetic of ethnic diversity and working-class authenticity which
their presence ironically and systematically erodes. Thus, in no small way do
these maps reflect the wider social, cultural and economic dynamism of the
capital’s micro-geographies and the transformative power of gentrification in
particular parts of London (Pratt, 2009).
Figure 11 further explicates the intriguingly different demographic com-
position of these three London Elites, comparing the Elites aged over and
under 40. This allows some comparison of change over time, though it is im-
portant to recognize that age, cohort and period effects are confused here. All
show a propensity towards self-recruitment, with a relatively large proportion
of the business Elite having a senior managerial family background (40 per
cent, compared to around 20 per cent for the other two Elite groups), a rela-
tively large proportion of the cultural elite coming from ‘modern professional’
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backgrounds (around 30 per cent), around double the proportion from the
other two groups, and the legal Elites with a high proportion from traditional
professions (many of whom might be lawyers). Interestingly, these trends to-
wards self-recruitment are not declining.7 Recruitment from routine and semi-
routine occupations is very small indeed, which indicates the extent of the
exclusiveness of this London Elite.
The patterns with respect to schooling are also striking. Around 40 per
cent of all these elite groups are recruited from independent schools, and this
proportion is somewhat higher for the younger age groups. This is largely expli-
cable in terms of the declining proportion of the younger age group recruited
from grammar schools, but Figure 11 shows this slack is taken up by 6th form
colleges and independent schools rather than comprehensive schools, whose
share of recruitment into all three Elite groups is falling slightly.
Conclusions
We should begin our conclusion by reiterating that since the GBCS is not a
representative sample, we are not in a position to establish definitive and causal
relationships about the relation between geography and social class. Nonethe-
less, we have shown patterns which we are satisfied are highly revealing. In
fact, the very geography of the sample skew is itself a fascinating indicator of
how the GBCS plays into an elite sensibility. We also hope to have shown
that because of its large sample size and granularity, the spatial analysis of the
GBCS can suggest striking features of contemporary elite formation which are
not readily discernible from other data sources.
Our main argument has been to suggest that GBCS data indicates how Lon-
don can be seen as an ‘Elite metropolitan vortex’. Within the UK, the elite,
whether as defined by our latent classes, or by NS-SEC I, are overwhelmingly
located in London and the south-east of England, and this geography plays a
central role in their formation: it is not incidental to who they are. The con-
centration of such Elites within London explains why their social capital tends
towards higher status contacts, and is hence more exclusive, and tends towards
greater sociability with other Elite members. By contrast, we doubt that other
urban locations, even including Edinburgh, act as a zone of elite formation
even in a more modest way. It is the distinctive combination of employment
opportunities, the housing market, and the elite educational system which al-
lows London to be a spatial vortex for the elites to emerge. We are therefore
doubtful of those who claim that elites operate beyond ‘place’. While Bridge
(1993) has argued that the impact of gentrification on the urban social land-
scape is not a simple one and is cross-cut by gender, ethnicity and life-stage, we
nonetheless believe that it is the patterns of closure which are most striking.
We can deduce patterns from the spatial evidence which imply that the Elite
have a distinctive geographical footprint which is consistent with their having
a clear spatial and social identity.
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We have also shown that there is no simple unitary London Elite. Different
sections of the Elite can be distinguished, each having a specific pattern of
recruitment and micro-geography within the city. We are hence not talking
about a cohesive ‘old boy’s club’, and the boundaries of this group go rather
wider than conventional and common-sensical understandings of elites. The
distinctive micro-geographies, however, also suggest that London is a site in
which these different groups can both find a habitus where they meet others
like themselves, and also co-exist close to other elite sectors. Thinking in these
terms allows us to see London as a highly specific spatial vortex where a range
of powerful and economically privileged elite agents can potentially access
each other whilst preserving also a distinct sub-culture of their own.
Durham University
LSE
Notes
1 See further, on the relationship between NS-SEC measures of class and those used in the
GBCS, Savage (this volume).
2 Spatial units with less than 100 GBCS respondents have been suppressed. The reason for the
use of a more aggregate level of geography in Northern Ireland was the markedly lower level
of response in comparison to other regions of the UK.
3 The correlation between the GBCS Elite and NS-SEC I was stronger than with the more
exclusive NS-SEC I.i, which returned an r2 of 0.76, p = < 0.001.
4 Removing City of London from the equation returned an r2 of 0.60.
5 Two weights were derived from the census; the first, to control for younger and more affluent
populations based on the shares of the local population aged under 35 and in NS-SEC I,
was applied to emerging cultural capital. The second controlled for older age groups and
more affluent populations by identifying the share of the population aged 50 or over and
the proportion in NS-SEC I and was applied to highbrow cultural capital. The aggregate
standardized or z score for each of these two sets of inputs was then used to weight against the
respective raw cultural capital scores. The application of such denominators to the raw data
has the effect of narrowing the range of score. To assess whether the range of values was still
significantly different from 0, the resulting weighted emerging and highbrow cultural capital
scores were measured in a t-test with a significant result for emerging (t(361) = 264.8, p < 0.01)
and also for highbrow (t(361) = 319.3, p < 0.01).
6 In a comparative European context, work by Andreotti and Le Gale`s (2008) has identified a
similar sense of deep socio-spatial embeddedness amongst the middle class in Milan and Paris.
7 Though given the marginal shifts in the proportions of the population in these different occu-
pations, it is likely that the relative rates of self-recruitment are falling somewhat. We also need
to bear in mind that it might take longer for the children of lower social classes to move into
elite positions and hence the differences are to be understood as age effects.
The images which appear in this article are referred to as being in colour – this
is how they appear online. However, in the hard copy they will appear in black
and white.
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